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W HEN in 1927 Augustus N. Hand was elevated from the
district court, where he had already earned an enviable
reputation, and began his great career on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Brandeis wrote him a con-
gratulatory note. Hand's gracious reply contained these two
sentences: "However much some of your associates may differ
with your general point of view, I believe they appreciate the light
you bring to many cases from sources they would never and by
their training and education could never explore. The thing which
impresses the average lawyer and the law professors about your
work is the thoroughness with which you proceed so that every-
thing is tied up before your opinion ends." Four years later, on
the occasion of Brandeis' seventy-fifth birthday, Augustus Hand,
who was not given to bandying compliments lightly, expanded on
this thought. "It is a rare thing," he wrote then, "to find anyone
who has your information about the facts affecting economic and
social principles and has even the tendency, let alone the capacity,
t The unpublished opinion here printed forms part of a collection of Justice
Brandeis' private papers to which Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard Law
School and the present writer have recently been granted access. It is to be in-
cluded in a book dealing with the Justice's unpublished opinions, which is currently
in preparation. This work has the financial support of the Jacob Brenner Memorial
Foundation, assisted by the Philadelphia Community Foundation, Inc. The opinion
is printed verbatim, except that obvious typographical errors have been corrected.
* Research Associate in Law, Harvard Law School. B.S., College of the City
of New York, 1947; LL.B., Harvard, 1949.
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to buttress his conclusions with precedents and convincing argu-
ment. I confess that the 'judicial hunch' is to me a terrible thing.
If I by mistake employ it I don't believe in any such nebulous
stuff and I think it at present a special danger. The worst literalist
and case judge is better than one who thinks he has everything in
his own hands. By it we should lose the only sanction for our
decisions. I have been particularly impressed by the care with
which you justify and fortify your conclusions in all the opinions
you write."
Augustus Hand's remarks are a fair assessment of the Brandeis
method, of the rules by which Brandeis abided in the practice of
his craft. And the unpublished opinion here printed is a represent-
ative example. Facts and understanding -so Brandeis preached
and so, almost always, he practiced - must precede judgment,
and they must be spread out in the opinion at whatever length
necessary, to explain judgment, to justify it and to gain accept-
ance for it. This was the proper way in which a decision was
made and announced. Its wellspring was principle, a coherent
philosophy of life and of government: in this, as in so many in-
stances, the conviction - generally accepted as doctrine but
much honored in the breach by Brandeis' colleagues - that
elected legislatures, not courts, should make social and economic
policy, and that such legislative policy should, within wide and
infrequently invoked limits, have the freest range. Whether it
was novel, experimental, unwise, profoundly disagreeable - all
that was not the Court's concern; when called upon to do so in
the course of litigation, it was for the Court faithfully to give
effect to legislative policy. But only one in command of all the
facts, the history of a statute, the needs that evoked it, the agita-
tion out of which it grew, the choices it embodies, can truly apply
such a principle. For on the surface - and to hindsight - the ca-
pricious is often indistinguishable from the merely foolish. And
the frailties of legislators and of language are such that a statute
may not, on its face, give the relevant indication of purpose; thus
it may leave a judge who looks no farther with little recourse but
to construe its ambiguities on the basis of "hunch" - whether or
not he acknowledges it even to himself.
There are opinions by Brandeis more strikingly illustrative of
the method which Augustus Hand admired, and of the guiding
principle it implemented. And there are other cases in which the
contrast between Brandeis and the "literalist" and the "hunch"
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judge is vivid. But the contrast is seldom so salient as in this
case, where, in the end, Brandeis and the brethren, in their dif-
ferent ways, came to the same result.
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 373 AND 391 - OCTOBER TElRmV, i9i9
SRATHEAPN S-TrAsmP COMPANY, On Writ of Certiorari to the
Limited, Petitioner, United States Circuit Court
373 vs. of Appeals for the Fifth
JoaN DmLON. Circuit.
J. M. TnoMPsoN, Master and Claimant On Writ of Certiorari to the
of the Steamship "Westmeath," United States Circuit Court
etc., Petitioner, of Appeals for the Second
391 VS. Circuit.
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Memorandum by MR. JusTicE BRANDEiS
The two cases present this question: Does Section 4 of the
so-called LaFollette Act of March 4, 1915 (c. 153, 38 Stat. i164,
i 16S) confer upon seamen of foreign vessels loading or unload-
ing in a port of the United States the right to demand while there
payment of one-half of all wages theretofore earned under their
shipping articles, although these were made abroad and pro-
vided, consistently with the law of the vessel, the place, and their
own nation, that payment of the wages should be deferred until
the termination of the contract? The foreign vessel owners and
the British Embassy contend both that Congress is without
power to confer such right and that it did not by the Seamen's
Act attempt to do so. It will aid in determining the validity of
these contentions to consider first the nature, the occasion, and
the purpose of the provision in question.
19s6] 1179
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First: The provision is primarily a regulation of the relation of
master and servant, similar in character to many which the States
have enacted in the exercise of their police power. It resembles
most closely weekly and fortnightly payment laws, likc that
sustained in Erie Railroad Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685. But it
is a modification of our shipping laws made by Congress in the
exercise of its power over admiralty and interstate and foreign
commerce.
The act of which it is a part contains twenty sections, the
whole being designed to complete the emancipation of Amer-
ican seamen and to make possible the participation of the United
States in the foreign carrying trade. The status of servitude,
fastened upon American seamen by the Act of July 20, 1790, c.
29, I Stat. 13i , was held not to have been affected by the Thir-
teenth Amendment, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, and
had become ever more galling by comparison with the increas-
ing liberties, the growing comforts, and the improved conditions
enjoyed by workingmen on land. As a result, relatively few
American citizens were willing to enter upon service at sea.
Efforts to ameliorate the condition of seamen were continually
engaging the attention of Congress. In the twenty years preced-
ing 1915 nine acts were passed to that end.- Flogging was abol-
ished in i85o; corporal punishment in 1898; and, in the same
year, the right to arrest seamen on American vessels for desertion
in American ports. The grosser incidents of servitude had thus
been largely overcome, and in the coast-wise carrying trade
conditions for seamen greatly improved. Congress had reserved
that trade exclusively to vessels built and owned in the United
States;2 and suppression through control by competing railroads
was guarded against.3 Fair wages and working conditions pre-
vailed. The industry developed.
In the foreign carrying trade American seamen remained
liable to arrest for desertion abroad. That was believed to be
necessary for the operation of our vessels. But vessels of the
"February 18, 1895, c. 97, 28 Stat. 667; March 2, 1895, c. 173, 28 Stat. 741;
March 3, 1897, C. 389, 29 Stat. 687; December z, 1898, c. 28, 30 Stat. 755; April
1i, 19o4, c. 1140, 33 Stat. i68; April 13, 1904, C. 1252, 33 Stat. i74; April z6, 19o4,
c. 1603, 33 Stat. 308; June z8, i9o6, c. 3583, 34 Stat. 551; March 2, 19o7, C. 2539,
34 Stat. 1z33; April 2, 1908, c. 1Z3, 35 Star. 55-
2Acts of September 1, 1789, c. 1i, 1 Stat. 55; December 31, 1792, C. I, I
Stat. 287; February x8, 1793, c. 8, 1 Stat. 305; March 1, 1817, c. 3I, 3 Stat. 351;
Revised Statutes, Section 4131; Act of May 28, 1896, c. 255, 29 Star. i88.
3 Report of Commissioner of Corporations on "Transportation by Water in
the United States," July 12, i9o9; December 23, i91z; Panama Canal Act,
August 24, 1912, c. 390, section Nx, 37 Star. 56o, 566.
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United States had almost ceased to engage in that trade. There
had been a continuous decline for nearly three-quarters of a
century. Between our ports and those of other countries, as well
as in the carrying trade wholly between foreign countries, our
vessels were subjected to the unrestricted competition of for-
eigners; for Congress had not afforded either to American capi-
tal or to labor engaged in such trade protection like that given
under the tariff to our manufacturing industries.4 It had not
even been found feasible to reserve the trade between the Philip-
pines and the United States to vessels of American registry.
5
Americans were practically barred from entering the mercan-
tile marine (otherwise than in the coast-wise trade,) except as
employees of foreign vessels; and this entailed temporary alle-
giance to the foreign flag, In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, and subjec-
tion to wages and a standard of living lower than those prevail-
ing in the United States.6 The Act of March 3, i813, c. 42, 2
Stat. 809, had made it unlawful to employ on board any public
or private vessel of the United States any person except a citizen
thereof or a native colored person. This act and supplementary
legislation were repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, c. 170, 13
Stat. zoi, so far as concerned employment of the crew. The
number of American citizens engaged in sea-faring grew steadily
less; and in 1914, when our mercantile marine was increased by
admission of foreign built ships to American registry, Congress
deemed it necessary (Act of August i8, 1914, c. 256, 38 Stat.
698), to authorize the President in aid of foreign commerce to
suspend the requirement that watch-officers be citizens of the
United States.
Congress investigated from time to time the causes of this de-
' "From 1789 until shortly before our civil war American shipping in the
foreign trade was in some form or degree protected, first by discriminating
duties and tonnage taxes, and later by mail subventions. It is a matter of record
that so long as it was protected it prospered. But for some unconscionable
reason, when the protective policy in general was strengthened and broadened
by the political party, which came into full power in x861, adequate encourage-
ment was denied to this one industry out of all our industries, and has been
denied to the present time." Report of Joint Commission on Merchant Marine,
December 6, i9o5, 59th Congress, ist Session, Report No. i, p. 6.
'Act of April 29, 1908, C. 152, 35 Stat. 70, amending Act of April i5, 19o4,
c. 1314, 33 Stat. x8r.
S"Ninety-three per cent of our foreign trade is carried in foreign ships
manned by foreign sailors. Of the few ships that carry the 7 per cent of our
foreign trade not 1o per cent of their crews are American citizens. Of this
very small number of American sailors in the foreign trade practically all of
them are . . . running under the Subsidy Act of r891. . ." Report of Minority
of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, May 22, 1912, 6zd
Congress, 2d Session, Report 645, Part 2, pp. 1-2.
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cline of the American mercantile marine and many bills were
introduced proposing remedies.7 Some minor measures designed
to remove provisions in then existing laws believed to be un-
necessarily burdensome and some to lessen otherwise the cost of
building, equipping and repairing and operating vessels engaged
in the foreign carrying trade and to promote their entrance into
it, were enacted from time to time; 8 but they had proved inef-
fective. Proposals repeatedly made for general bounties, sub-
ventions, and subsidies and for discriminating duties and
discriminating tonnage taxes, had all been rejected. The pro-
posal of Government ownership and operation of vessels in the
foreign trade was not then accepted.' Committees of Congress
concluded that the decline of the American merchant marine
.was the result of lower costs in building, equipping and operat-
ing foreign vessels; and that the lower cost of operation was due
mainly to their lower wage scale and the inferior living condi-
tions of their crews; and that equalization of operating costs in
this respect would be an indispensable factor in reestablishing
our mercantile marine. With this general end in view Congress
had provided a generation earlier (by Act of June 26, 1884, c.
12i, section 20, 23 Stat. 58,) that American vessels could engage
7 41st Congress, 2d Session, Report from the Committee on the Causes of
the Reduction of American Tonnage, February 17, i87o, No. z8; 47th Congress,
2d Session, Report of Joint Select Committee on American Shipping, December
15, i887, Report No. 1827; 58th Congress, 3d Session, Report of American Mer-
chant Marine Commission, January 4, 1905, Report No. 7755, and No. 2755,
Part 7; 61st Congress, zd Session, Report of House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, February 2i, 19o, Report No. 502; 61st Congress, 3d
Session, Report of said committee, February 24, 19i1, Report No. 2253.
" The Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, 23 Stat. 53, contained many such minor
provisions including one (section 16) permitting the importation of supplies
free of duty; thus supplementing Section io of the Act of June 6, 1872, c. 315,
sec. io, 17 Stat. 230, 238, which placed on the free list certain material for
building, equipping and repairing wooden vessels built in the United States for
foreign trade. By the McKinley Tariff Act of October x, 189o, C. 1244, sec-
tions 8 and 9, 26 Stat. 567, 614, free entry was granted also to material used for
building, equipping or repairing steel vessels engaged in the foreign carrying
trade; and the privilege was extended by later acts. See Act of August 27,
1894, c. 349, Section 7, 28 Stat. 509, 548; Act of August 5, i909, c. 6, Sections
19, 2o, 36 Stat. i , 88. By Act of March 3, 1891, C. 519, 26 Stat. 830, limited pro-
vision was made for aiding American ships in the foreign trade by mail
subsidies. By Act of May io, 1892, c. 63, 27 Stat. 27, a limited provision was
made for American registry of foreign-built vessels to be so engaged. And
some aid was given to the ocean merchant marine by the extension of the
American monopoly in the coasting trade to Alaska, Act of July 27, i868, c.
273, 15 Stat. 24o; Hawaiian Act of April 30, 1900, C. 339, sec. 98, 31 Stat. i61,
and Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392.
' See Act of Sept. 7, 1916, C. 451, 39 Stat. 728.
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seamen in foreign ports to serve for round trips without being
required to reship them in ports of the United States. Thus
equalization with foreign operating costs was sought to be at-
tained by reducing the standard of American wages to that of
the foreign competitors. The provision failed to accomplish its
purpose. The committees of Congress in reporting the LaFol-
lette bill recommended trial of a new method. It was to over-
come the reluctance of Americans to engage in sea-faring by
completing the emancipation of seamen; and to equalize operat-
ing expenses by raising to the American standard the wages and
conditions of seamen on foreign vessels. To accomplish this;
the committees proposed, among other things, to abrogate the
existing right of arresting American seamen for desertion abroad
and to emancipate all seamen on foreign vessels entering ports
to the United States for the following reason.
It had been the common practice of such foreign vessels to en-
gage their seamen abroad for long periods of service, or, at least,
for a period covering the return or outgoing voyage from the
United States. It was also the common practice of such foreign
vessels to make to seamen an advance payment at the signing
of the shipping articles, and to provide in the articles for defer-
ring payment of substantially the balance of the wages earned
until the termination of the shipping contract. Prior to the pas-
sage of the Act of March 4, 1915, seamen on foreign merchant
vessels who deserted while in American ports were liable to
arrest; and by many treaties American magistrates and courts
were bound to lend aid in arresting and returning them to their
ships. See Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169; compare Tucker
v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424. The committees of Congress con-
cluded that if seamen on foreign vessels were freed from liability
to arrest in our ports for desertion and this exemption from
arrest were coupled with a provision enabling the seaman to ob-
tain here payment of a substantial part of all wages theretofore
earned and remaining unpaid, foreign vessels engaged in the
American trade would be compelled to raise wages and working
conditions to practically the standard prevailing in our coast-
wise trade. For otherwise they would lose many seamen when-
ever they entered a port of the United States, and they would
be unable to ship new crews except at the rate of wages prevail-
ing in America. As a very large part of the world's shipping
was required to carry America's exports and imports,10 some
0 It was said in 19o6 that 5oo,ooo sailors enter the port of New York each
year. Hearing, 59th Congress, ist Session, on H. R. 383, before Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, February 2, i9o6. In r914 the number of
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believed this equalization of operating expenses would extend
gradually to vessels engaged in the carrying trade wholly be-
tween foreign countries; and, if the initial cost of the vessels
should lso be equalized, America would be able to compete for
the foreign carrying trade. To equalize the initial cost of vessels,
Congress had already provided in 1912 for American registry of
foreign built cargo vessels not more than five years old, and in
1914 had removed the age limit."- The purpose to effect such
equalization of costs was clearly set forth in reporting the meas-
ure to Congress as will be hereafter shown.'2 Such is the nature
of the measure in question; such the evils against which it was
aimed and the means by which it was proposed to overcome
them. Was it within the power of Congress to employ these
means and did Congress express its intention to do so?
Second: The foreign vessel owners and the British Embassy
contend that Congress is without power to confer upon foreign
seamen of a foreign vessel the right to demand while in our ports
and to recover here wages earned abroad under a contract made
abroad and valid where made, if the contract specifically pro-
vides that the payment of the wages shall be deferred and be
made abroad. They say that this want of power is apparent
where, as in these cases, the vessel, the seaman, the place of con-
tract and the agreed place of payment are all of the same for-
eign country. But the contention will not bear analysis. Such
legislation, it is argued, impairs the obligation of contracts. The
constitutional inhibition against impairing the obligation of con-
tracts does not apply to acts of Congress. Furthermore, the
contract of the Strathearn was made after the LaFollette Act
became operative, and those of the Westmeath after the date of
its enactment. Compare Diamond Glue Co. v. United States
Glue Co., 187 U.S. 6x 1, 615; Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 482. No treaty presents any ob-
stacle; for the act by its terms provides for the abrogation of all
treaties inconsistent with it. (Sections i6 and 17.) The objec-
masters, officers and men employed in Great Britain's merchant marine
(20,3oo,ooo gross tons) being one-half the world's tonnage, was only 295,652.
Commerce Reports, January z6, 1920, p. 507.
" Act of August 24, 1912, c. 390, Section 5, 37 Stat. 560, 562; Act of August
18, 1914, c. 256, 38 Stat. 698; Letter of Acting Secretary of Commerce, Decem-
ber 1z, 1914, 63d Congress, 3d Session, Sen. Doc. No. 640; Foreign Vessels Ad-
mitted to American Registry, 63d Congress, 3d Session, H. Doc. No, 1664,
March 2, 1915.12 Reports of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Sixty-
second Congress, Second Session, May 2, 1912, No. 645; Sixty-third Congress,
Second Session, June i9, 1914, No. 852.
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tion to the validity of the provision must rest, therefore, wholly
on supposed rules of admiralty or of international law.
It is urged that, by general consent of the nations, the regula-
tion of the rights and duties of officers and crew are, like matters
of internal discipline, to be determined by the law of the coun-
try to which the vessel belongs- and not by the law of the
place where she may, from time to time, happen to be. This un-
doubtedly is the general rule. But it is such only because of the
consent of each nation affected and to the extent to which such
consent has been given either by implication from prevailing
custom or expressly by treaty or legislation. Without such con-
sent no nation can legally possess extraterritorial rights within
the territory of another. As said in Schooner Exchange v.
M'Fadden, 7 Cranch. i i6, 136: "The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and . . . is sus-
ceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. . . . All excep-
tions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within
its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself." In the absence of such consent, express or implied, every
foreign vessel owes temporary and local allegiance to the coun-
try whose port she enters and becomes amenable to the jurisdic-
tion and laws of that country. See United States v. Diekelman,
92 U.S. 520.
The decided cases illustrate how narrow are the extra terri-
torial rights conceded by the United States to foreign merchant
vessels; and the tendency to restrict them further is indicated by
our legislation. Thus in Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. i, despite
the common treaty provision conferring upon the Belgian con-
sul cognizance of differences between captains, officers and
crews of Belgian merchant vessels in our ports, a felonious homi-
cide committed on such a vessel in a New Jersey port was held
to be within the jurisdiction of the State although committed by
one Belgian upon another Belgian, both members of the crew,
and although the affray occurred and ended wholly below the
vessel's decks and the tranquility of the port was in no wise dis-
turbed or endangered thereby. In Patterson v. Bark Eudora,
i9o U.S. 169, the Act of December 21, 1898 prohibiting pay-
ment in advance of seamen's wages was held applicable to
foreign merchant vessels in our ports, even if the seamen en-
gaged were also foreigners. In Bucker v. Klorkgeter, Fed. Case
2083, it was held that our admiralty courts would take jurisdic-
tion of a suit for wages by a foreign seaman against the vessel
of his nationality where the interests of justice appeared to de-
mand it, although the shipping articles entered into abroad pro-
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vided that the seaman could seek redress only in the courts of
his country. Compare The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364. In
Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, a provision in a bill of lading
limiting liability for negligence, given in a foreign port by a
British vessel covering a shipment to this country, was held void
because in violation of our statutory law; and in The Kensington,
183 U.S. 263, a similar provision relating to baggage, in a ticket
sold abroad by a foreign vessel to a passenger bound for this
country, was held void because not in harmony with our pub-
lic policy as interpreted by the courts. In The Titanic, 233 U.S.
718, the limitation of liability under the Harter Act (to the
benefit of which foreign vessels had been declared entitled in
The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24; The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540,
The Germanic, x96 U.S. 589, and La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95),
was held to be applicable to a liability arising out of a contract
made in England by a British ship with a British citizen, al-
though the British law on the subject differs from our own.
It is insisted that while one country may decline to enforce in
its courts a cause of action arising abroad, if the foreign law from
which it springs contravenes the public policy of the forum, it
may not create a liability out of acts occurring abroad, which
do not, by the foreign law, give rise to a cause of action. Com-
pare Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co., 194 U.S. I2O, i26;
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356;
Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478. The general
principle may be admitted; but it has no application here. The
liability for wages arises when they are earned. There is debitum
in praesenti, solvendum in futuro. The wages earned abroad
are, therefore, owing though not due. See Bouvier's Law Dic-
tionary; "Owing." The rule is applied in the attachment and
the bankruptcy laws, which permit proceedings to be brought
before the maturity of the claims of complainants. Compare
Schunk v. Moline, Milburn &' Stoddart Co., 147 U.S. 5oo; F. L.
Grant Shoe Co. v. Laird Co., 2 12 U.S. 445. Refusal to give full
effect to the provision in the foreign shipping articles deferring
payment of wages earned may rest, also, on the general rule, that
where illegal conditions or clauses in a contract do not go to the
whole consideration or where they are severable, they may be
ignored and the contract enforced as if the invalid provision had
never been inserted therein. Thus in Knott v. Botany Mills,
supra, and The Kensington, supra, defences based upon clauses
in contracts made abroad which unquestionably go to the liabil-
ity, - like that limiting the carriers' liability for negligence, -
were disregarded because contrary to our law; and the contracts
1186 [Vol. 69
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were enforced as if these clauses had not been inserted therein.
The provision deferring payment may also be likened to clauses
in contracts made abroad restricting suit to courts of the foreign
country, or to clauses by which the parties bind themselves to
submit any controversy to arbitration. In such cases it is held
that the provision, although binding by the law of the foreign
country, goes only to the remedy and that the suit will be enter-
tained by our courts, although both parties are subjects of the
country in which the contract was made. The Eros, 241 Fed.
i86, i9; 251 Fed. 45; certiorari denied, 247 U.S. 509.
Congress having absolute power over foreign commerce,
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470; Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranaban, 214 U.S. 320; Weber v. Freed, z39 U.S. 325; may
prescribe the conditions under which it will admit foreign ves-
sels; and it may express the condition in the form of a pecuniary
obligation to its seamen inconsistent with the shipping articles.
Patterson v. Bark Eudora, supra, p. 178. It is clear, therefore,
that Congress possesses the power to confer upon foreign sea-
men on foreign vessels coming into our ports the right to de-
mand payment of half the wages earned, even though by con-
tract made abroad and valid where made, payment was to be
deferred. The question remains however: Did Congress ex-
press its intention to confer such right?
Third: Section 4 closes with the following clause: "This sec-
tion shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of
the United States and the Courts of the United States shall be
open to such seamen for its enforcement." The main provision
of the section is this:
"Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be en-
titled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to
which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have
then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has
been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage
is ended and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall
be void; Provided, Such a demand shall not be made before the
expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure
on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall re-
lease the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full
payment of wages earned."
Thereby section 4 amended the then existing law (section 6
of the Act of July zo, 1790, c. 29, i Stat. 133, incorporated in
the Revised Statutes as Section 4530, and amended by Section 5
of the Act of December 21, 1898, c. 28, 30 Stat. 755, 756), in the
following particulars:
I9561 XI87
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i. The half-wages made demandable are those "earned" in-
stead of those "due."
2. The half-wages are made demandable notwithstanding
any "stipulations in the contract to the contrary." The then
existing law had denied the right to payment if "the contrary be
expressly stipulated in the contract."
3. The half-wages earned were made demandable only after
"the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days." There
was no such limitation in the then existing law.
4. Failure to comply with the demand releases "the seaman
from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of
wages earned." There was no such provision in the then exist-
ing law.
3
5. The section is made to apply to foreign vessels as above
set forth. There was no such provision in the then existing law.
The contention that section 4 should not be construed as con-
ferring upon foreign seamen on foreign vessels the right to half-
wages earned is urged upon several distinct grounds. In the first
place it is said that the provision should be limited to American
seamen on foreign vessels. The second construction suggested
is that the provision should be held to apply only to such seamen
on foreign vessels as had been shipped in American ports. A
third construction offered is that the provision be held to apply
to all seamen on foreign vessels wherever shipped, but that the
extent of the recovery be limited to wages earned in American
ports; and, as a further limitation upon its application, it is
asserted that no right to demand even these wages arises until
the vessel has been in the American port for five days. Compare
The Ixion, 237 Fed. 142, 144; The Italier, 257 Fed. 712, 714;
The Delagoa, 244 Fed. 835.
The argument that the proviso should be limited to American
seamen on foreign vessels rests mainly upon the fact that the act
is entitled "to promote the welfare of American seamen," etc.
This argument may be answered by reference to the familiar
rule of construction, that the title forms no part of an'act, and is
not to be resorted to in order to create an ambiguity. United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch. 358, 366; United States v. 0. & C.
R. Co., 164 U.S. 526, 541; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418. For
the natural meaning of "seamen on foreign vessels" is all seamen;
and no reason appears for narrowing that meaning here. The
" There was added by Section 4 the further proviso: "That notwithstanding
any release signed by any seaman under section forty-five hundred and fifty-
two of the Revised Statutes any court having jurisdiction may upon good cause
shown set aside such release and take such action as justice shall require."
[Vol. 691188
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Act of December 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 755, 763, construed in Pat-
terson v. Bark Eudora, supra, was entitled "An act to amend the
laws relating to American seamen, for the protection of such sea-
men, etc."; and the clause there in question, which provided in
almost identical terms that it should apply to foreign vessels, was
held to be applicable to foreign as well as to American seamen
thereon. Compare United States v. McArdle, 2 Sawyer 367;
United States v. Sullivan, 43 Fed. 602; United States v. Anderson,
io Blatchf. 2z6, 228. If, however, the title is to be considered, it
should be noted that it is "to promote the welfare of American
seamen in the merchant marine of the United States." The tide
affords, therefore, no basis for the contention that the proviso in
question related to American seamen on foreign vessels. But the
tide further declares it is an act "to abolish arrest and imprison-
ment as a penalty for desertion and to secure the abrogation of
treaty provisions in relation thereto," a purpose obviously re-
ferring mainly to foreign seamen on foreign vessels. And would
it not promote the welfare of the American seamen in the
American merchant marine to equalize conditions and operating
costs and make employment therein possible? Furthermore, the
last clause of the proviso, in declaring our courts open to such
seamen, makes clear that the proviso applies to foreign seamen.
Americans shipped as seamen on foreign vessels were already
entitled to resort to our courts to enforce rights against the vessel.
The Falls of Keltie, 114 Fed. 357; The Neck, 138 Fed. r44;
The Epsom, 227 Fed. 158. Our courts of admiralty possessed,
in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, jurisdic-
tion also in controversies between a foreign vessel and her officers
or crew; but our courts usually decline, as a matter of discretion,
to entertain law suits by foreign seamen; The Belgenland, supra.
By treaties with some countries, our courts were precluded from
doing so. The Salomoni, 29 Fed. 534; The Burchard, 42 Fed. 6o8;
The Koenigin Luise, 184 Fed. 170. Consequently foreign sea-
men needed a grant of the right to sue.
Like the first construction suggested, both the second and
third empty the proviso of substantially all effect, as applied to
foreign vessels. To limit the application of the section to seamen
shipped in an American port would so narrow its scope as to
make it inefficacious. To give seamen the right to demand half
the wages earned during the days that a foreign vessel is loading
or unloading in an American port, and then only after she had
been there at least five days, holds out no grant of freedom, even
when coupled with the right to enforce payment in our courts.
It reminds of the bondage-provision in section 4 of the Act of
1189
HeinOnline  -- 69 Harv. L. Rev.  1189 1955-1956
July 20, 1790, c. 29, 1 Stat. 133, which declared that "no sum
exceeding one dollar shall be recoverable from any seaman or
mariner by any one person for any debt contracted during the
time such seaman or mariner shall actually belong to any ship
or vessel, until the voyage for which such seaman or mariner
engaged shall be ended."
If, as the contentions made here and decisions below indicate,
(see, also, The Sutherland, 26o Fed. 247), the words of the act
standing alone leave a doubt as to the intention of Congress, we
.may resort to the reports of the committees of Congress to aid
in ascertaining its intention. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strana-
ban, 214 U.S. 320, 333; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worth-
ington, 141 U.S. 468, 474. And the following passages from
their reports, together with facts recited above, show con-
clusively that the several constructions suggested by the foreign
vessel owners and the British Embassy are each contrary to the
intention of Congress and that the section was properly con-
strued by the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The LaFollette Act originated in the Senate (S. 136). When
the bill reached the House it was referred to the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries which at this and previous
sessions of Congress had considered a similar measure.1 In
recommending important amendments to the section under con-
sideration, which were accepted by the Senate conferees (House
Report 1439, 63d Congress, Third Session), and later enacted
into law, the committee reported as follows (House Report 85z,
p. i9, 63d Congress, Second Session, June 19, 1914):
" ..It is claimed that by making the provisions of section
3 of the Senate bill and section 4 of the committee substitute
apply to foreign ships it will tend to equalize the operating
expenses of vessels. It is also claimed that the provisions of this
bill abolishing arrest for desertion will be largely annulled if the
foreign shipowner may by the terms of his contract deny the
seaman the right to receive in our ports any part of the wages
earned by him; that while the deserting seaman would not be
subject to arrest, he would be compelled, if he deserted, to do
so without a penny in hand to buy bread or procure a night's
lodging; and it is claimed also that if American vessels are subject
to the provision allowing seamen to demand half their wages
earned, while foreign vessels are not, the shipowner might and
" Sixty-second Congress, Second Session, H. R. 23673; Report from House
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, May 2, i912, 6znd Cong.,
2nd Sess., Report No. 645.
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probably would put his ship under a foreign flag to avoid this
obligation.
"Quoting from the report on H. R. 23673, known as the
seaman's bill, made to the House of Representatives in the Sixty-
Second Congress, second session, May 2, 191 z:
" 'Under existing laws men may be and are employed at
the ports where the lowest standard of living and wages obtain.
The wages in foreign ports are lower than they are in the ports
of the United States; hence the operating expenses of a foreign
vessel are lower than the operating expenses of an American
vessel. It is not proposed to prevent vessels from employing
seamen in ports where they can secure them cheapest, but it is
proposed by this bill to give the seamen the right to leave the
ship when in safe harbor, and in time this will result in foreign
seamen engaged on vessels coming into ports of the United
States being paid the same wages as obtain here, as a means of
retaining their crews for the return voyage. That will equalize
the cost of operation, so that vessels of the United States will not
be placed at a disadvantage.'
". .. If, however, giving greater freedom to the seaman shall
operate not only to equalize wages, but to elevate and better the
conditions and service of the seaman, which is its purpose, then
the provision will justify itself and be of benefit to the American
merchant marine in equalizing the cost of operation as between
our ships and those of other nations.
"It should be stated that the committee are not unanimous in
making this provision apply to foreign ships.
"Some members of the committee doubt our right and the
wisdom of making it apply to foreign ships and question its value
to our merchant marine."
The report of May 2, i91z, had declared in introducing the
passage quoted above (p. 7):
"Two things are essential to the building up of our merchant
marine; one is the creating of a condition where the initial cost of
the vessel is as low as that of the foreign vessel and the other is
an equalization of the operating expenses.
"This bill will tend to equalize the operating expenses."
And on the following page (8) - the report of May 2, 1912
- gave the further explanation:
"The section thus amended gives the seaman the right to de-
mand one-half the wages due him in any port, notwithstanding
any contract to the contrary, and extends its application to sea-
men on foreign vessels while in American harbors, and the whole
section becomes part of the means by which the cost of opera-
19s61 11g1
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tion of all vessels taking cargo out of any American port may
be equalized." 15
Senator Fletcher in reporting to the Senate the Seamen's Bill,
enacted March. 4 , 1915, said (5o Cong. Record, 5748-9):
"The three main purposes were: First, to give freedom to
seamen and improve their condition; second, to promote safety
of life at sea; third, to equalize the wage cost of operating vessels,
foreign and domestic, taking cargoes or passengers from ports
of the United States. It is very generally acknowledged that the
bill will accomplish those three purposes ...
"First, Senate bill 136 permits seamen on foreign vessels to
leave their vessels in ports of the United States; that was one
thing to be worked out; second, it permits seamen to draw one-
half of the pay due them in any port where the vessel lies or
delivers cargo, making this section applicable to foreign vessels
while they are within the jurisdiction of our laws; ...
"The right to one-half of the earned wages at a stopping place
on a voyage would seem to be reasonable. It would not induce a
sailor to leave a ship when he was being decently treated and
fairly compensated to have the privilege of quitting and collect-
ing only one-half of what he had earned. On the other hand, if
the sailor is maltreated, or for sufficient reason he quits the vessel,
perhaps in a strange land, he should at least have one-half the
wages he has earned in cash. The forfeiture of the other half
would seem to be ample allowance by way of liquidated damages
for breach of his contract ... "
The enactment of the provision had been recommended by
the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor in a joint
communication to the Senate committee (63d Congress, ist
Session, Senate Document No. zI, p. 6), which said: "The
section thus amended gives the seaman the right to demand one-
half the wages due him in any port, notwithstanding any con-
tract to the contrary, and extends its application to seamen on
foreign vessels while in American harbors, and the whole section
becomes a part of the means by which the cost of operation of all
vessels taking cargo out of any American port may be equalized."
The Senate bill had used the expression "one-half part of the
wages which shall be due him at every port." To make certain
that half the wages earned were to become payable Congress
adopted upon recommendation of the House committee, as a
substitute, the language: "One-half part of the wages he shall
have then earned." Whatever doubt might otherwise have
existed, the Reports of Congress made it clear that Congress in-
15 For vigorous dissent see the Minority Report, 62d Congress, 2d Session,
May 22, x912, Report 645, Part 2.
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tended that seamen on foreign vessels should be entitled to receive
at every port an amount up to one-half of the wages earned then
remaining unpaid under the shipping contract.
The foreign vessel owners and the British Embassy urge that
the decisions below are inconsistent with the decision of this
court in Sandberg v. McDonald (The Talus), 248 U.S. 185;
Neilsen v. Rhine Shipping Co. (The Rhine), and Hardy v.
Shepard and Morse Lumber Company (The Windrush), 248
U.S. 205. The contention rests upon misapprehension. The pre-
cise question there involved was not whether the provision con-
cerning advances applied to foreign vessels but whether it ap-
plied to advances made abroad. Because the place of the advance
was deemed decisive, it was held inapplicable there to both the
American and the foreign vessels. On the other hand the pro-
vision conferring the right to demand half-wages is confessedly
applicable to American vessels wherever the wages were earned,
whatever the nationality of the seamen, and wherever the demand
may be made; and the United States gives this right to seamen
on foreign vessels when they enter our ports; and that is prac-
tically the extent of our sovereign power. In reaching the con-
clusion that Section io of the act did not apply to advances
made abroad this court deemed the provision for criminal lia-
bility of "great importance as evidencing the legislative intent
to deal civilly" as well as criminally only with matters in our
own jurisdiction. No such criminal provision is attached to
Section 4. Furthermore the court, having examined the "reports
and proceedings in Congress there referred to" found in them
"nothing which requires a different meaning to be given the
statute." Here the opposite is true.
The contention that Dillon's demand was premature because
made within three days after the arrival of the ship at Pensacola
is also shown by its history and the Report of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (p. i8) to be wholly unfounded.
The bill, as it came from the Senate, contained no such provision.
It was inserted by the House Committee which said: "To pre-
vent any unnecessary annoyance of the captain of the ship on
voyages where the vessel may call at ports oftener than once in
five days, it is provided that the demand for wages shall not be
made more often than once in five days." As was stated by the
Court of Appeals in the Strathearn case: "Evidently the inten-
tion was that such a demand should not have the effect given to
it by the statute, if it is made within five days after the voyage
was commenced of if made sooner than five days after- the
making of a previous demand contemplated by the statute."
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T HE history of Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon 1 in the SupremeCourt goes back to November i918, more than a year before
the date of Brandeis' opinion. At that time the case was first argued
together with Sandberg v. McDonald,2 which involved a closely
related issue. The section of the La Follette Act on which Dillon's
claim depended provided for the payment to seamen, upon de-
mand, of one half of the wages earned when the vessel reached a
safe port, anything to the contrary in the contract of employment
notwithstanding. The Sandberg case turned on another section
of the same act, which rendered unlawful the payment of advance
wages at the time of hiring, either to a seaman or, as was more
usual, to an agent who had acted for him in arranging his employ-
ment. Violation of this section was made a misdemeanor punish-
able by a fine and a prison term. It was also provided that the
payment of advance wages could not avail as a defense to a later
suit for recovery of wages otherwise due. Like the provision
which Dillon invoked, this section was made applicable to foreign
vessels while in waters of the United States.
Sandberg, not a United States national, had signed for a voyage
on a British ship in Liverpool, and, as was customary and legal
in Britain, had received an advance payment on account of wages.
When the ship put in at Mobile, Alabama, Sandberg asked for
payment of one half of the wages then earned. This was the same
demand that Dillon made. Sandberg's master, unlike Dillon's,
tendered payment in response to the demand, but, in reckoning
what was due, deducted the amount advanced in Liverpool. It
was Sandberg's position that this deduction was inconsistent with
the provision of the La Follette Act declaring advance payments
unlawful. He quit the ship, being logged as a deserter, and brought
his libel.
In both the Dillon and Sandberg cases, the seamen urged the
Court to construe the La Follette Act as reaching out beyond the
customary province of national legislation. Admiralty normally
regards a ship as an extension of the territory of the nation of its
flag, and holds that questions relating to the internal economy
and discipline of a ship, to the conditions of seamen's employ-
ment, are governed by the law of that nation. Moreover, it is a
maxim of private international law that the validity of contracts,
1 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
2 248 U.S. 185 (,g8).
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such as the articles signed by both Dillon and Sandberg, and the
legality of most acts undertaken pursuant to the terms of a con-
tract, such as the refusal to pay half-wages to Dillon and the
tender of an advance to Sandberg, are governed by the law of the
place where the contract was concluded.
These and like rules of international courtesy and convenience
are of long standing, and it is the natural and on the whole
beneficial impulse of courts to resist their casual abrogation. To
some extent, doctrines of private international law placing limits
on national legislative power are held to be incorporated in the
Constitution.' In both these cases, therefore, as Brandeis pointed
out in his Dillon opinion, the Court was faced with two questions.
First, did Congress have the power to reach out in the fashion in
which the seamen claimed it had done, and, second, had Congress
done so, had it truly intended to disregard the laws of other na-
tions and impose its own will to the limit of its power, or had it
meant its enactment to be construed in light of traditional rules.
Though it was argued in both cases, the issue of power was in
neither one very difficult. For the imposition of our will occurred
within American waters. Compliance with the provisions of the
La Follette Act was a condition attached to permission to enter
our ports, which it is plainly within national power to deny.
The effect of this condition, if any, on transactions taking place
abroad was indirect. The second question was the difficult and
decisive one. For a judge who simply took the advance payments
and the half-wages sections of the act at face value and read
-them separately, the question of congressional purpose was
baffling.
The drafting of the sections was inartistic. With respect to
each, for every exegetical argument which pointed one way,
there was another tending in the opposite direction. Thus, Con-
gress could not have intended to punish the making of advances
abroad, where its jurisdiction did not extend. That would have
been a futile purpose. Hence the section must have meant to
outlaw only advances to a seaman hired in an American port.
But Congress had said that a seaman suing here might recover
wages otherwise due, despite the fact that he had already been
paid them by way of an advance. That was a perfectly enforce-
able purpose, as applied to advances made both here and abroad.
3 See Note, 7 MiAMi L.Q. 400 (953).
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Or, Congress would not have expressly provided, as it did in the
half-wages section, that our courts should be open to seamen for
its enforcement, if it had not meant the section to apply to foreign
seamen, for our courts are necessarily open to our own citizens.
But our courts had also, for more than a century, been hearing
suits for wages by foreign seamen, although in doing so they
generally applied the law of the flag, and exercised, at least in
theory, discretion to dismiss such suits on the ground that another
forum would be the more convenient one.4 And the question was
not whether a foreign seaman might, everything else being equal,
sue for half-wages, but whether he was entitled to them when his
contract of employment, providing otherwise, was concluded
abroad. If it was necessary to open the courts to foreigners at all,
it could have been thought necessary to do so for the case where
the contract was made here.
The ease with which exegesis could lead to opposite but on
the whole equally plausible results is demonstrated by the Sand-
berg case, which a majority of five decided adversely to the sea-
man, a month and a half after the argument. Day spoke for the
Court. The advance payment of wages was legal where made, he
said, and, conceding that the United States might disregard it with
respect to foreign vessels seeking to enter our ports, Congress had
manifested no intention to do so. "How far was [the advance
payments section] . . . intended to apply to foreign vessels?"
Day asked. "We find the answer if we look to the language of the
act itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels
'while in waters of the United States.' " I Moreover, the fact that
criminal sanctions were imposed made it doubly plain that ad-
vances paid abroad were not affected.
Proceeding in exactly the same fashion, McKenna, who, joined
by Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke, wrote the dissent, arrived at
the contrary conclusion. On its face, he said, the section was
clearly applicable. The Court was not "called upon to assign the
genesis of the policy or trace the evolution of its remedy .... "
"Ours," McKenna declaimed, "is the simple service of interpreta-
tion, and there is no reason to hesitate in its exercise because of
supposed consequences." The statute was unambiguous. To de-
' See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CoRNEi L.Q. 12, i9-26 (1949).
5 248 U.S. at 195.
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part from the grammatical meaning of the language, to qualify it,
to wander from its "certainty" to "the uncertainties of construc-
tion," would "take us from the deck to the sea, if we may use
a metaphor suggested by our subject." 6
At the same time, Day, again speaking for the majority, held
that advances on account of wages made by an American ship on
the occasion of hiring seamen in Buenos Aires were also not
affected by the act. More in sorrow than in anger, Day remarked
that the advances in this case were actually paid not to the sea-
men, but to an agent without whose intervention seamen's services
could not be obtained in Buenos Aires - a custom "which works
much hardship to a worthy class." 7
The Dillon case was not disposed of at that term. A technical
and remediable jurisdictional flaw necessitated that it be returned
to the lower court." But the Sandberg decision augured ill for
Dillon's chances when his case should come back up with the
jurisdictional defect removed. Distinctions were possible, to be
sure. But the outlook was poor, considering the ready answer
which, in Sandberg, the Court had sought and found in the
language of the act. If the legality of advances made abroad was
respected, why should not the same courtesy be extended to con-
tracts made there and providing, as Dillon's did, for payment of
wages only at the conclusion of the voyage? It was no doubt just
as well for Dillon that an incidental jurisdictional error prevented
the judgment in his case from being delivered in due course, to-
gether with the judgment in Sandberg. That this is more than
idle speculation is indicated by the events which took place a year
later, after Dillon's case had been argued once more. It was at this
time that Brandeis wrote his opinion. His law clerk, Dean Ache-
son, made a somewhat rueful memorandum, telling what hap-
pened, which he filed with the Justice's papers in the case. The
memorandum wastes no words and reads as follows:
This opinion was prepared at a time when it appeared that the
decision might have gone against the interpretation of the act which
is here advocated. The Chief Justice was wavering, Pitney, Van
Devanter, Day and McKenna were contra. I don't remember
whether a copy was sent to the Chief or not. But eventually it was
I1d. at 201, 202.
TNeilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U.S. 205, 213 (I918).
8 Dillon v. Strathearn S.S. Co., 248 U.S. 182 (Ig8).
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decided according to this view and Judge Day wrote a poor opinion.
This took the Justice two weeks of hard work while court was
sitting. D.G.A.
Chief Justice White, Pitney, and Van Devanter had been with
Day in the Sandberg case. It had been Day's rather than Mc-
Kenna's literalism that had convinced them then, and the con-
viction very likely lingered. McKenna himself may well have
thought that Sandberg - a decision he had contested and lost -
ruled this case, and that that ended the matter; or, in the per-
formance, on the deck, of the simple service of literal interpreta-
tion, he may have seen differences between the advance payments
and half-wages sections which enabled him to hold the second
inapplicable where he had applied the first.
The facts which Brandeis set forth as decisive in his Dillon
opinion cut through the inartistic drafting of the La Follette Act
and dissipated the bafflement to which it gave rise. Indeed, these
facts decided more than the Dillon case; they were sufficient also
to resolve in favor of the seaman the ambiguities of the advance
payments section involved in the Sandberg case. In light of the
rational purpose central to the entire statute, verbal distinctions
between the advance payments and half-wages sections evap-
orated. Congress, it became clear, wanted to force the payment by
foreign masters to foreign seamen of a substantial portion of their
wages upon demand, in order to make it possible for such seamen
to jump ship - as Sandberg did - and in order thus to cause
foreign owners, if they wished to retain their employees, to raise
their wage and other standards to those Congress was requiring
on American ships. Advances made abroad were not punished, to
be sure, although advance payments in American ports were
rigorously outlawed. Yet the making of advances abroad could be
discouraged, and this the two sections, read together so as to pre-
vent advances previously made from being reckoned in the cal-
culation of half-wages due in American ports, could accomplish.
In this way the American seaman's lot could be bettered without
weakening the competitive position of American shipping. Pres-
sure was applied to improve conditions on foreign ships as well,
thus affirmatively bolstering the American competitive position,
which had long been on the decline, in part at least because Amer-
ican labor costs were higher.
There can be little doubt that these considerations, and not
.1198 [Vol. 69
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McKenna's touching verbal certainties, determined the result for
Brandeis in Sandberg as well as in Dillon. Yet Brandeis signed
McKenna's dissent, in which none of this emerges. We do not
know why Brandeis failed to write in the Sandberg case nor, of
course, whether if he had written there would have been a chance
of gaining a court for his result. In the month and a half between
the argument of Sandberg and its decision, Brandeis delivered six
opinions. Five of these were opinions of the Court, and he may
well have felt that disposing of them should take precedence over
the writing of dissents Of the five, one had been held over from
the previous term, and Brandeis doubtless considered it particu-
larly urgent.10 Another, though decided unanimously in the end,
had been troublesome, becoming the subject of a debate with
Pitney which occasioned an exchange of special memoranda."
The sixth, delivered the day the Sandberg case itself came down,
was Brandeis' massive and important dissent in International
News Serv. v. Associated Press,2 also a case pending from the
previous term. In the same six-week period, Brandeis received as
well the assignment of at least one other opinion of the Court.
This was a case argued after Sandberg. It may also have had
priority, and it came down two weeks after Sandberg.'8 It is thus
likely that in the relatively short time which Day took to write the
majority opinion, Brandeis simply had no chance himself to write.
He might of course have held up the disposition of the case, had
it been up to him to speak for the dissenters. But McKenna, next
to Holmes, was the quickest producer on the Court. His dissent
was most likely written and circulated in ample time to come
down when the majority was ready. It is quite a different matter
9 Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U.S. ii S (decided December 9, I918); Tempel v.
United States, 248 U.S. 121 (decided December 9, x1i 8 ) ; United States v. Spearin,
248 U.S. 132 (decided December 9, 1918); Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar
Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139 (decided December 9, 1918); MacMath v. United
States, 248 U.S. i51 (decided December 9, 1918).
" Iowa v. Slimmer, supra note 9 (argued April 15, 1918).
"' Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918).
12 248 U.S. 215, 248 (argued May 2 and 3, 1918; decided. December 23, 1918).
3aTurner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (argued November 13 and 14, 1918;
decided January 7, i919). See also these Brandeis opinions: Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
Ry. v, Maucher, 248 U.S. 359 (argued December i7 and E8, i918; decided
January 7, i919) ; Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Sealy, 248 U.S. 363 (argued Decem-
ber 18, 1918; decided January 7, x919); Merchants Exchange v. Missouri ex rel.
Barker, 248 U.S. 365 (argued December 19, i918; decided January 7, 1919).
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to hold up decision of a case for the purpose of writing another,
rather than the only, dissent.
Of one thing we can be certain, and that is that what Brandeis
wrote in the Dillon case, which is so different from what he signed
in Sandberg, did not come as an afterthought. The history of
seamen's legislation and the legislative history of the La Follette
Act itself had been argued in the briefs for Sandberg, earnestly
if not as exhaustively as Brandeis himself was to discuss them.
Moreover, Brandeis did not need counsel to draw his attention to
these matters. His awareness of them is shown by the manner of
his drafting of the Dillon opinion. It was the law clerk who col-
lected the comprehensive list of statutes going back to the earliest
days. But Brandeis had started writing before he had the cita-
tions, and he referred to the subject matter of a number of the
statutes, leaving blank spaces to be filled in when specific refer-
ences became available.
Brandeis' general familiarity with seamen's legislation may be
traceable to his close friendship with one of the sponsors of the
Seamen's Act of 1915, the elder Robert M. La Follette.14 Brandeis
had often, before coming to the Court, acted as a sort of unofficial
legislative counsel to La Follette. 5 There is no evidence whatever
that Brandeis helped draft this statute, but he cannot have failed
to be familiar with La Follette's activities in its behalf. Moreover,
La Follette was its chief legislative promoter. But the principal
motive force behind it was another man whom Brandeis be-
friended, and whom, no doubt, he had heard speak about sea-
men's problems. This was a remarkable humanitarian figure,
Andrew Furuseth, the president of the International Seamen's
Union of America. The passionate and dedicated Furuseth, born
in Norway, had been to sea as a boy and young man and, battered
but neither broken nor bent by the hardships of life before the
mast, had formed, as La Follette wrote, the deliberate purpose
"to get one great nation to provide by law a haven where seamen
could escape tyranny and maltreatment aboard ship. One country
where a sailor could lawfully leave his ship would serve to elevate
the condition of labor at sea throughout the world." 16 Furuseth
" See MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LI= 353, 356-57, 365-76 (1946).
15 See i LA FOLLErTE & LA FOLLETTE, ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 336-37, 346-47,
475 (1953).
"
6 See z id. at 522.
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selected the United States as his battleground, jumping ship here
and taking up residence early in the 188o's. From then on his
campaign was unrelenting and effective. He called on leading
men, preaching his cause, "a great soul speaking through his face,
the set purpose of his life shining in his eyes." '7
It was Furuseth's unshakable purpose, communicated to more
than one congressman, which, wedded to a policy of restoring
the competitive position of American bottoms in international
trade, informed the La Follette Act of 1915. An echo of Furuseth's
fervor resounds in these words (perhaps Furuseth wrote them;
he took an active interest in the preparation of seamen's cases,
often working with counsel) from one of the briefs filed in behalf
of Sandberg: "This 'Seamen's' Act is no ordinary act of the Con-
gress! . . . The pages of the Federal Reporter . . . are full
of stories of how, under the cloak of the advance, had hidden the
assassins of his [the seaman's] character and his wages. Societies
sprang up in the name of humanity to protect him. Years pass
and at last through the long night there flashes for the seaman
the light of the 'Seaman's' Act!" 18
When Brandeis came to write in the Dillon case, which had
been fortuitously saved for another day, it was not enough, how-
ever, to set out the considerations which he deemed decisive. For
Sandberg was by then on the books, and it had to be dealt with if
a majority, let alone a unanimous Court, was to be obtained for
a result favorable to the seaman's claim. It is almost certain that
overruling so recent a precedent as Sandberg would have been
out of the question for most of the Justices. And so Brandeis'
opinion suggested unconvincing verbal distinctions and refrained
from pointing out that, in light of the materials it discussed, the
Sandberg case had been wrongly decided.
As Acheson's contemporaneous note suggests, and as appears
from a brief notation in Brandeis' hand on a copy of his opinion,
1 See I id. at 521-22. The quotations are from an article by Robert M. La
Follette, published in April 1915. See also A SymPosium ON ANDREW FURUSETH
(Axtel ed., undated); TAYLOR, TE SAILORS' UNION OF TE PACIFIC (31923). For a
detailed description of Furuseth's activities in connection with seamen's legislation,
including the La Follette Act of 19x5, see LA FOLLETTE & LA FOLLETTE, op. cit. supra
note IS, at 500, 520-36. For indication of Furuseth's friendship with Brandeis, see
letter from M. E. Waggaman, Furuseth's secretary, to Silas B. Axtell, printed in
A SymPosium ON ANDREW FURUSETEu, supra at 35-37.
"sPetition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief in Support of Petition, p. iI, Sand-
berg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918).
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there was no general circulation of it. It is nevertheless possible
that Brandeis showed the opinion privately to a few of his col-
leagues (he had the final draft printed in ten copies), and he
certainly made its contents known in conference. The assignment
to Day, once Brandeis' result was accepted, may be attributable
to the situation created by Sandberg. That case and the decision
in Dillon had to be reconciled. Nothing could leave a stronger
impression of conflict than if Dillon were written by one of the
Sandberg dissenters. Nor could anything give a greater appear-
ance of consistency - fcir the benefit of wavering brethren and
afterward of the bar - than that the same Justice should write
both cases. In any event, however, it is quite doubtful that in the
spring of 192o a majority of the Justices would have signed an
opinion such as Brandeis' in the Dillon case. Their attitude
toward historical and legislative materials is indicated by a re-
mark of Day's at the end of his Sandberg opinion. He alluded
there to "the reports and proceedings in Congress during the
progress of this legislation," to which counsel had drawn atten-
tion. He held them up at a distance, gingerly and uncertainly,
his face partly averted, as if they were something he had picked
out of a bundle of laundry. We have examined counsel's ref-
erences, he said, "so far as the same may have weight in determin-
ing the construction of this section of the act. We find nothing in
them, so far as entitled to consideration .... ," 19 Perhaps, as
Augustus Hand surmised, the light Brandeis shed was appre-
ciated. But it had - for Day and his colleagues - to remain
decently under a bushel.
In writing what became the unanimous opinion in Dillon, de-
livered in March 192o, Day went about his business as he and
McKenna had done in the Sandberg case. The statute was by its
terms applicable to seamen on foreign vessels putting in at Amer-
ican ports. It was manifest on its face that it was meant to be
so applicable, since provision was made to open the courts to
seamen with claims under the statute. Then, still dealing with the
words of the statute only, Day went on to make the following
assertion, similar to the one at the heart of Brandeis' opinion. It
was stated without documentation by Day:
Apart from the text, which we think plain, it is by no means clear
that, if the act were given a construction to limit its application to
19 248 U.S. at 197.
[Vol. 691202
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American seamen only, the purposes of Congress would be sub-
served, for such limited construction would have a tendency to pre-
vent the employment of American seamen, and to promote the
engagement of those who were not entitled to sue for one-half
wages . ... But, taking the provisions of the act as the same
are written, we think it plain that it manifests the purpose of
Congress to place American and foreign seamen on an equality of
right in so far as the privileges of this section are concerned ....
In the case of Sandberg v. McDonald . . . we found no purpose
manifested by Congress . . . to interfere with wages advanced in
foreign ports under contracts legal where made.
20
By way of support for this argument, Day mentioned that a pre-
decessor statute, in also creating a right to half-wages, had
limited it to cases in which the articles did not provide to the
contrary. In the La Follette Act, this proviso had fallen. Hence
it was plain that Congress wanted half-wages to be recoverable,
no matter what had been agreed to in the articles. But it is, of
course, on this basis alone, anything but plain that Congress was
thinking of articles signed between foreigners abroad as well as
contracts made here.
Eight years after the Dillon case had been decided, the issue of
Sandberg v. McDonald was before the Court once more. The ad-
vance payments section had since been amended slightly, and it
was argued for the seaman, with some force, that the congres-
sional purpose had been to overrule the Sandberg result. But
once more the statutory language harbored ambiguities (if, like
McKenna, one may use a nautical turn of speech suggested by the
subject). A unanimous Court dealt with it on its face. The dis-
tinctions made in Dillon came home to roost, and Sandberg was
reaffirmed. 2 Brandeis was silent. Nevertheless, in the generation
since Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, Brandeis' method of ascertain-
ing legislative purpose, for which he gained no acceptance in that
case, has made much headway. It is as normal today as it was
unusual then for the Court to look to legislative materials for
indications of basic purpose and then to apply broadly or poorly
worded statutes in conformity with that purpose. The method is
today almost a matter of course; so much so that it has at times
been abused; so much so also that there is evidence of reaction
20 252 U.S. at 354-55.
21 Jackson v. S.S. "Archimedes," 275 U.S. 463 (1928).
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setting in against it. There are those who feel that to speak of a
legislative intent is theoretically untenable and too often un-
realistic. And there are those who fear that the prevalence of this
method promotes irresponsibility in Congress, manifested by an
unhealthy tendency to legislate by committee report.2 2 Much -
though not all -of this current of doubt, of second thought, is
directed only at abuses of the method, which cannot be charged
to Brandeis. Among those whose misgivings went the whole way
was the late Mr. Justice Jackson. He expressed them both
judicially and in extrajudicial writings.3
In his last full year on the bench, before his illness, Jackson
dealt in an elaborate opinion with a problem not unlike that pre-
sented by the Dillon case. A successor statute to the La Follette
Act of 1915, the Jones Act of 1920, creates a cause of action at
law, with right to trial by jury, in favor of seamen injured in the
course of their employment. The act applies, in this respect, to
cany seaman." 24 The suit in question was by a Danish seaman
employed on a Danish ship, who was, injured in Havana, Cuba.
Jackson, for the Court, held the Jones Act inapplicable.2 5 With-
out suggesting that Congress would have had no power to make
the act applicable, but without, also, seeking such light as the
legislative and historical materials might' have supplied, he con-
cluded that Congress had not intended to give a remedy in a
situation such as this. The normal doctrines of private inter-
national law showed what an extraordinary thing it would have
been for Congress to have so intended. At the end there is this
passage:
In apparent recognition of the weakness of the legal argument,
a candid and brash appeal is made by respondent and by amicus
briefs to extend the law to this situation as a means of benefiting
seamen and enhancing the costs of foreign ship operation for the
competitive advantage of our own. . . . The argument is mis-
addressed. It would be within the proprieties if addressed to Con-
22 See, e.g., Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 Vem. L. REv.
407 (ig5o); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REv. 527 (i947); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863 (1930).
But cf. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAMsv. L. REv. 886 (1930).
23 See Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the
Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948).
241 STAT. 1007 (2920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
25 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
[Vol. 691204
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gress. Counsel familiar with the traditional attitude of this Court
in maritime matters could not have intended it for us.26
It may well be that the argument was indeed not tenable with
respect to this provision of the Jones Act. Just the same, one can-
not help being struck by Jackson's tone of dignified outrage. It
reminds one of the Day and McKenna opinions in Sandberg. Pre-
cisely this sort of contention was decisive for Brandeis. The briefs
in Jackson's case, including one filed in behalf of the Friends of
Andrew Furuseth Association, though not exhaustive, buttressed
the argument with reference to historical and legislative materials.
Brandeis would certainly have wanted to meet it factually.
2 8
id. at 593.
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